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Courts and Judicial Procedure
Henry G. McMahon*
I. COURTS
Most of the 1954 legislation on this subject relates to city
courts and is of little general interest to the profession. The
statutes of the past session produced a bumper crop of salary
increases for judges, clerks, and other officers of the courts.'
Three additional city courts were created, for Eunice,2 Sulphur,8
and Springhill.4 The maximum jurisdictional limit for cases
tried in the City Court of Lafayette was increased from three
hundred to five hundred dollars, exclusive of attorney's fees and
interest.5
An additional judge was provided for the Sixteenth Judicial
District Court, but with the requirement that one of the three
judges of that court be an elector of St. Martin Parish, the sec-
ond of Iberia Parish, and the third of St. Mary Parish.6 This
requirement is patently unconstitutional, as the legislature has
* Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. Increased salaries were granted by the following 1954 acts to the
personnel mentioned: La. Acts 1954, No. 4, amending LA. R.S. 13:1982 (1950)
(clerk of the first city court of New Orleans); La. Acts 1954, Nos. 158-160,
amending LA. R.S. 13:2423-2425 (1950) (judge, clerk, and marshal of the
municipal court of Ruston); La. Acts 1954, No. 369, amending LA. R.S. 13:2283,
2284, and 2286 (1950) (judge, clerk and marshal of the city court of Minden);
La. Acts 1954, No. 396, amending LA. R.S. 13:2013-2015 (1950) (judge, clerk,
and marshal of the city court of Alexandria); La. Acts 1954, No. 404, amend-
ing LA. R.S. 13:2492(C) and 2495 (1950) (judges and clerk of the municipal
court of New Orleans); La. Acts 1954, No. 424, amending LA. R.S. 13:1566
(1950) (judges of the juvenile court for the Parish of Orleans); La. Acts
1954, No. 432, amending LA. R.S. 13:2384 (1950) (judge of the city court of
New Iberia); La. Acts 1954, No. 569, amending LA. R.S. 13:2338-2340 (1950)
(judge, marshal, and clerk of the city court of Morgan City); La. Acts 1954,
No. 609, amending LA. R.S. 13:692(C) (1950) (making mandatory an additional
salary for the judge of the twenty-second judicial district court by the police
juries of the parishes within the district, which previously had only been
authorized); La. Acts 1954, No. 637, amending LA. R.S. 13:782 (1950) (clerks
of court of all parishes having a population ranging between seventy
thousand and one hundred and fifty thousand).
2. La. Acts 1954, No. 16, incorporated as LA. R.S. 13:2151-2158 (Supp.
1954).
3. La. Acts 1954, No. 60, incorporated as LA. R.S. 13:2482.1-2482.18 (Supp.
1954).
4. La. Acts 1954, No. 368, incorporated as LA. R.S. 13:2483.1-2483.17 (Supp.
1954).
5. La. Acts 1954, No. 364, amending LA. R.S. 13:2213 (1950).
6. La. Acts 1954, No. 445, incorporated as LA. R.S. 13:621.1 (Supp. 1954).
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no power to add to the qualifications of the judiciary prescribed
by the Constitution.1
If there is one subject relating to the courts which requires
standardization and uniformity throughout the state, it is the
days and hours which offices of clerks of district courts are re-
quired to be open for the transaction of business. Four unfor-
tunate precedents of local variation were established during the
1954 session."
The only legislation relating to the courts passed at the last
session which is of general interest to the profession was the
amendment of the clerk of court statute. The quasi-judicial
powers of the clerk, granted under constitutional authority,9
were broadened in two respects to authorize him to sign orders:
(1) for the issuance of reiterated summons to return to the mat-
rimonial domicile in cases where separation from bed and board
is sought on the ground of abandonment, and (2) to rule the
inheritance tax collector into court in succession proceedings to
fix the inheritance taxes due by the heirs or legatees.10
II. CIVM PROCEDURE
Actions
No single rule of Louisiana procedure has had a more frus-
trating experience than that designed to prevent the abatement
of actions upon the death of a party. In the draft of the first
Code of Practice, the Livingston Committee included an article
which provided expressly that "actions do not abate by the
death of one of the parties after answer filed."'" This provision
was retained without change in the 1870 revision.' 2 Despite the
broad and sweeping language of the article, the Supreme Court
held in Chivers v. Roger,"3 by a divided court, that an action
7. Knobloch v. 17th Judicial Dist. Democratic Executive Comm., 73 So.2d
433 (La. App. 1954).
8. La. Acts 1954, No. 22, incorporated as LA. R.S. 13:756.1 (Supp. 1954)
(affecting the clerk of court of St. John the Baptist Parish); La. Acts 1954,
No. 24, amending LA. R.S. 13:756 (1950) (affecting the clerks of court of
Jefferson and St. Bernard Parishes); La. Acts 1954, No. 42, amending LA.
R.S. 13:756 (1950) (affecting the clerk of court of St. Tammany Parish);
La. Acts 1954, No. 61, incorporated as LA. R.S. 13:756.3 (Supp. 1954) (affecting
the clerk of court of St. Charles Parish).
9. LA. CONST. Art. VII, § 66.
10. La. Acts 1954, No. 426, amending LA. R.S. 13:901 (1950).
11. Art. 21, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1825.
12. Art. 21, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1870.
13. 50 La. Ann. 57, 23 So. 100 (1898). For the effect of this decision, see
Voss, The Recovery of Damages for Wrongful Death at Common Law, at
1954]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
brought by a beneficiary under Article 2315 of the Civil Code
abated upon his death, even though answer had been filed. This
decision was followed consistently,'14 although both before and
after the Chivers case the Supreme Court held that there was
no abatement of the action in such cases after rendition of a
judgment in favor of a plaintiff who died pending appeal.15
To overturn the rule of Chivers v. Roger, in 1946 the legis-
lature adopted a statute providing that "there are no exceptions
to the rule that an action does not abate by the death of one
of the parties thereto after issue joined.""' (Italics supplied.)
This provision was duly incorporated into the Revised Statutes
in 1950.17 Yet, in the first case in which the Supreme Court was
called upon to apply the statutory rule, it held that the provision
had been repealed impliedly by a 1948 amendment to Article
2315 of the Civil Code.18
In drafting the projet of the proposed new Code of Practice,
the Louisiana State Law Institute adopted the following provision
on the subject:
"An action does not abate on the death of a party. The
heirs, legatees, administrator, or executor of the deceased
party, as the case may be, may be substituted. This rule
also applies to actions brought under Article 2315 of the
Civil Code, unless the action has survived in favor of a sur-
vivor designated therein. The only exceptions to this rule
are actions to enforce rights or obligations which are strictly
Civil Law, and in Louisiana, 6 TULANE L. REV. 201, 233 (1932); Oppenheim,
The Survival of Tort Actions and the Action for Wrongful Death-A Survey
and a Proposal, 16 TULANE L. REV. 386, 412 (1942); Comment, Wrongful Death
and Survival of Tort Actions in Louisiana, 1 LOYOLA L. REV. 84, 90 (1941).
14. Hebert v. United States, 39 F. Supp. 267 (E.D. La. 1941); Hardtner v.
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 189 So. 365 (La. App. 1939). See also Kerner v.
Trans-Mississippi Terminal R.R., 158 La. 853, 104 So. 740 (1925).
15. Vincent v. Sharp, 9 La. Ann. 463 (1854); Castelluccio v. Cloverland
Dairy Products Co., 165 La. 606, 115 So. 796 (1927); Williams v. Campbell,
185 So. 683 (La. App. 1938); Foy v. Little, 197 So. 313 (La. App. 1939), 15
TULANE L. REV. 135 (1940).
16. La. Acts 1946, No. 239, p. 738.
17. LA. R.S. 13:3349 (1950).
18. Gabriel v. United Theatres, 221 La. 219, 59 So.2d 127 (1952), 13 Loui-
SIANA LAW REVIEW 518 (1953). This case appears to have been decided errone-
ously for two reasons. First, the 1948 amendment to Article 2315 of the
Civil Code did not specifically and specially make any exception to the rule,
as required by both La. Acts 1946, No. 239, § 5, p. 738, and LA. R.S. 13:3349
(1950). Second, even if the 1946 act and the 1948 amendment to Article 2315
were in conflict, LA. R.S. 13:3349 (1950) constituted the later expression of
legislative will and should have prevailed. City of Alexandria v. LaCombe,
220 La. 618, 57 So.2d 206 (1952).
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personal, and exceptions provided expressly, or by necessary
implication, by statutes adopted hereafter."1 9
Article 21 of the Code of Practice sought to prevent abate-
ment after answer filed, while the 1946 act sought to prevent
abatement after issue joined. The article proposed by the Law
Institute goes further, and would prevent abatement after insti-
tution of the action.20 This article also embodies carefully se-
lected language which would expressly overrule the Chivers
decision. The last sentence of the Law Institute's article would
retain the rule of statutory construction against implied repeal
by subsequent legislation contained in the 1946 act; it would
further recognize an exception which the courts would be com-
pelled to make in any event-in the case of rights or obligations
which are strictly personal.21
Two separate acts on the subject were adopted during the
1954 session. One merely amends the pertinent provision of
the Revised Statutes so as to prevent abatement of the action
after institution of suit.22 The other, amending Article 21 of the
Code of Practice, provides that:
"An action does not abate on the death of one of the
19. Art. 9, Book I, Preliminary Titles, Title III, Civil Actions, 1 ExPosei
DES MOTIFS No. 5, p. 22 (Louisiana State Law Institute, May 3, 1954), as
amended on June 5 and 6, 1954, by the Committee on Semantics, Style and
Publications of the Louisiana State Law Institute.
20. There is no reason why the rule against abatement should obtain
only if an answer has been filed, or issue joined. By the institution of the
suit, the obligee indicates conclusively his intention to enforce the obliga-
tion, and the right of his heirs or legatees to continue its prosecution after
his death should not depend upon the accidents of the defendant filing an
answer or joining issue.
21. "The broad and sweeping language of the 1946 act and R.S. 13:3349,
however, will present very considerable difficulties to the court. McMahon,
Louisiana Legislation of 1946 (Civil Procedure), 7 La. L. Rev. 23, 36-40
(1946); Comment, 4 Loyola L. Rev. 75 (1947). For instance, if a citizen
brought a suit to force the registrar of voters to permit him to vote, and
died after issue joined but while the action was pending, could anyone suc-
cessfully contend that the action had not abated? Yet both the 1946 act and
R.S. 13:3349 state dogmatically that there are no exceptions to the rule that
an action does not abate on the death of a party after issue joined. Similarly,
if a husband sued for divorce or separation, and died after answer was filed
but pending a decision, could anyone successfully contend that his action
did not abate on his death? Of necessity, actions to enforce personal rights
must be excepted from the rule. An obligation strictly personal-defined by
Article 1997 of the Civil Code as an obligation which 'none but the obligee
can enforce the performance, or when it can be enforced only against the
obligor'-likewise must be excepted. ...
"The proposed article, therefore, provides that 'actions to enforce rights
or obligations which are strictly personal' are exceptions thereto. This
language recognizes exceptions which, despite the sweeping language of
R.S. 13:3349, our courts would be forced to make." Art. 9, Book I, Preliminary
Titles, Title III, Civil Actions, 1 ExPose DES MOTIFS No. 5, p. 22 (Louisiana
State Law Institute, May 3, 1954).
22. La. Acts 1954, No. 59, amending IA. R.S. 13:3349 (1950).
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parties after suit has been filed, and the heirs, legatees, ad-
ministrator, or executor of the deceased party may be sub-
stituted as parties in any case wherein they succeed, by
operation of law, to the rights of the deceased party."23
These two statutes appear to have been intended to accom-
plish the objectives of the Law Institute in drafting its recom-
mended article. The 1954 statutes, unfortunately, appear to go
no further than the 1946 legislation in overturning Chivers v.
Roger.
The institution of an action interrupts prescription in two
different ways in Louisiana. First, under a 1932 statute,24 the
mere filing of suit in a "court of competent jurisdiction" suffices
to interrupt the current of prescription. Competency, within
the intendment of this statute, has been interpreted to mean
jurisdiction ratione materiae et personae.25 Second, under the
pertinent Civil Code provision,26 even if the suit is filed in an
incompetent court or in an improper venue, prescription is
interrupted by the service of citation upon the defendant. One
of the acts adopted at the last legislative session amends this
Code provision by adding the language: "The provisions of this
article likewise apply to actions ex delicto, heretofore or here-
after filed, in a United States District Court of America, when
and if said court holds it is not a court of competent jurisdic-
tion. 2 7 This amendment actually makes no change in the law
of Louisiana, for the added language is merely declaratory of
the jurisprudential rule on the subject.28
Following the French law,2 9 the Louisiana Civil Code pro-
vides that if the plaintiff, after having instituted his suit, dis-
23. La. Acts 1954, No. 57, amending Art. 21, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1870.
24. La. Acts 1932, No. 39, p. 223, LA. R.S. 9:5801 (1950). The same rule
was adopted earlier, but restricted to cases in which the defendants were
domestic or foreign corporations, by La. Acts 1914, No. 267, § 27, p. 521, and
was retained, but only with respect to domestic corporate defendants, by
La. Acts 1928, No. 250, § 66, p. 409, LA. R.S. 12:66 (1950).
25. Flowers v. Pugh, 51 So.2d 136 (La. App. 1951). See also Comment,
Interruption of Prescription by Judicial Action in Louisiana, 14 TULANE L.
REV. 601 (1940).
26. Art. 3518, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
27. La. Acts 1954, No. 532, amending Art. 3518, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
28. Blume v. New Orleans, 104 La. 345, 29 So. 106 (1900); Vernon v.
Illinois Cent. R.R., 154 La. 370, 97 So. 493 (1922); Board of Com'rs v. Toyo
Kisen Kaisha, 163 La. 865, 113 So. 127 (1927). Cf. Hotard v. Brodr Wilhelm-
sen Aktieselskabet, 23 F.2d 668 (5th Cir. 1928); Brandon v. Kansas City So.
Ry., 7 F. Supp. 1008 (W.D. La. 1934). See also Comment, Interruption of
Prescription by Judicial Action in Louisiana, 14 TULANE L. REV. 601 (1940);
Note, 13 TULANE L. REV. 312 (1939).
29. Art. 2247, FRENCH CIVIL CODE.
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continues or abandons it, the interruption of prescription through
the institution of the action shall be considered as never having
happened.30 For years, the courts performed the very difficult
task of determining, from the particular facts of each case,
whether the plaintiff had abandoned his action. 1 Then, in 1898,
the pertinent Civil Code article was amended by adding a second
paragraph providing that:
"Whenever the plaintiff having made his demand shall
at any time before obtaining final judgment allow five years
to elapse without having taken any steps in the prosecution
thereof, he shall be considered as having abandoned the
same."
32
Originally, the quoted language was interpreted in a number
of decisions as applicable to appeals pending in the appellate
courts, as well as cases pending in the trial courts.3 3 In 1932,
however, the Supreme Court overruled this line of cases, and
held that the quoted language had no application to appeals
pending in the appellate courts.34 Quite recently, the Supreme
Court adopted a rule treating as abandoned, and as requiring
summary dismissal, appeals "pending on the regular docket, in
which five years have elapsed without any steps being taken in
the prosecution thereof.13 5
An act adopted at the last session expressly extends the Code
rule of abandonment to all appeals pending in all appellate
courts, by adding a third paragraph to the pertinent Civil Code
article, providing that:
"Any appeal, now or hereafter pending in any appellate
court of this state, in which five years have elapsed without
any steps having been taken in the prosecution thereof, shall
be considered as abandoned, and the court in which said
appeal is pending shall summarily dismiss such appeal."36
30. Art. 3519, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
31. Teutonia Loan & Building Co. v. Connolly, 133 La. 401, 63 So. 63
(1913).
32. La. Acts 1898, No. 107, p. 155, amending Art. 3519, LA. CIVIL CODE of
1870.
33. New Orleans v. New Orleans Jockey Club, 129 La. 64, 55 So. 711
(1911); Hibernia Bank & Trust Co. v. Jacob A. Zimmerman & Sons, 167 La.
751, 120 So. 283 (1929); Mouton v. Morgan's Louisiana & T.R. & S.S. Co.,
5 La. App. 745 (1927); Good v. Picone, 18 La. App. 42, 137 So. 870 (1931). See,
however, Reagan v. Louisiana Western R.R., 143 La. 754, 79 So. 328 (1918).
34. Verrett v. Savole, 174 La. 844, 141 So. 854 (1932).
35. Rule VIII, § 3, REVISED RULES OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA (1951).
36. La. Acts 1954, No. 615, amending Art. 3519, LA. CIvIL CODE of 1870.
1954]
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It is unfortunate that the draftsman of this legislation did
not track the language of the Supreme Court Rule on the sub-
ject, for the latter contains a provision which the statute lacks.
The Supreme Court Rule afforded a reasonable period after it
became effective for an appellant, who otherwise would have
been cut down at the knees by the retroactive rule, to prevent
the dismissal of his appeal by prosecuting itY. The absence of
any such reservation raises a very serious question as to the
constitutionality of the 1954 act.3 8 This fact, however, presents
no serious obstacle to the ultimate future enforcement of such
a rule by the intermediate appellate courts, as it is believed that
they have ample authority to adopt a rule similar to that of
the Supreme Court.8 9
Venue
Three statutes were adopted at the last session changing the
rules relating to the parishes in which actions may be brought.
The first,40 amending Article 165 (10) of the Code of Practice,
made two important changes in the venue of actions brought to
enforce insurance policies: (1) by adding a fourth optional venue
for an action on a fire insurance policy,41 and (2) by providing
three additional optional venues for an action on a policy of
vehicle collision insurance.42
37. "The provisions of this section are intended to be retroactive and to
become effective upon the adoption of these rules but the right is reserved
to the appellant or appellants in any case now pending, in which no action
has been taken for five years, to move for the transfer of the case to the
preference docket within a period of six months following the publication
of these rules in the advance sheets of the Southern Reporter." Rule VIII,
§ 3, REVISED RULES OF SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA (1951).
38. Cf. Atchafalaya Land Co. v. F. B. Williams Cypress Co., 146 La.
1047, 84 So. 351 (1920), aff'd, 258 U.S. 190 (1922); State ex rel. Richardson v.
Recorder of Mortgages, 12 La. App. 62, 125 So. 473 (1929); State v. Alden
Mills, 8 So.2d 98 (La. App. 1942), rev'd on other grounds, 202 La. 416, 12 So.
2d 204 (1943).
39. LA. CONST. Art. VII, § 27; Cox v. Shreveport Packing Co., 202 La.
325, 31 So.2d 815 (1947).
40. La. Acts 1954, No. 261, amending Art. 165, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of
1870. Only subdivision 10 of this article was changed by this amendment.
41. Prior to the 1954 amendment, an action on a fire insurance policy
might be brought, at the option of the plaintiff: (1) at the domicile of the
insurer, (2) at the place where the insurer's principal agency was estab-
lished, and (3) in the parish where the loss occurred. The 1954 amendment
purports to add two additional optional venues: (1) at the domicile of the
insured, and (2) in the parish where the accident occurred. It will be noted
that the latter is only an inaptly phrased repetition of the third optional
venue mentioned above.
42. The amendment purports to afford five optional venues to the plain-
tiff suing to enforce a policy of vehicle collision insurance: (1) at the
domicile of the insurer, (2) at the place where the insurer's principal agency
COURTS AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE
The second of these acts43 fills a long-felt need by providing
expressly for the venue of interpleader proceedings. The Inter-
pleader Act had no definite provisions on the subject, contenting
itself with providing merely that the plaintiff might deposit the
funds "in the registry of the district court having jurisdiction. '44
The question of the proper venue of interpleader proceedings was
first raised in Louisiana Oil Refining Corporation v. Williams,45
where the court held that an interpleader proceeding was an
action in rem involving the ownership of the fund deposited, and
that consequently the proper venue was the domicile of the
plaintiff who owed the money deposited. Despite this ruling,
however, the practice had developed in mineral rights cases of
bringing the interpleader proceeding in the parish where the
oil well was situated, though in none of these cases reaching
the appellate courts was the venue challenged. 4  Finally, in
Amerada Petroleum Corporation v. State Mineral Board,47 where
this practice was followed, the court held that the interpleader
proceeding was properly brought in the parish where the oil well
was situated.
The 1954 statute amends the Interpleader Act by providing
two different venues for proceedings brought under the statute.
If the money deposited is due, or claimed to be due,
"... on account of any sale, lease or other transaction affect-
ing or pertaining to immovable property or any character of
interest therein, such deposit shall be made in the registry
of the district court having jurisdiction of the parish wherein
said immovable property is situated, or, if said property be
situated in more than one parish, then in the registry of any
district court having jurisdiction over any parish wherein a
part of said immovable property is situated. ' 4
In all other cases, the interpleader proceeding may be brought
was established, (3) in the parish where the loss occurred, (4) at the
domicile of the insured, and (5) in the parish where the accident occurred.
It will be noted that Nos. 3 and 5, in substance, are identical; while No. 1
was already available under Art. 162, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1870.
43. La. Acts 1954, No. 523, amending LA. R.S. 13:4811 (1950).
44. La. Acts 1922, No. 123, § 1, p. 252, LA. R.S. 13:4811 (1950).
45. 170 La. 218, 127 So. 606 (1930).
46. Superior Oil Producing Co. v. Forrestier, 185 La. 11; 168 So. 313 (1936);
Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Calcasieu Real Estate & Oil Co., 185 La. 751, 170
So. 785 (1936); Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Carter, 187 La. 382, 175 So. 1
(1937); Placid Oil Co. v. Iebert, 194 La. 788, 194 So. 893 (1940); Standard
Oil Co. of Louisiana v. Hightower, 3 So.2d 472 (La. App. 1941).
47. 203 La. 473, 14 So.2d 61 (1943).
48. La. Acts 1954, No. 523, amending LA. R.S. 13:4811 (1950).
1954]
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in any "district court having jurisdiction of the domicile of one
or more of the claimants thereto."
The third statute on the subject 49 provides the exclusive
venue of actions to partition and liquidate the community of
acquets and gains dissolved by a judgment of divorce or separa-
tion from bed and board. Under Demoruelle v. Allen,0 such a
partition proceeding might have been brought either in the court
which rendered the judgment of divorce or separation, or the
court having jurisdiction over the property sought to be parti-
tioned. Under the 1954 statute, venue of all such proceedings is
vested exclusively in: (1) the court having jurisdiction over the
last matrimonial domicile of the spouses; (2) if there is no such
domicile in the state, then in the court having jurisdiction over
the immovable property, and if the latter is situated in more
than one parish, then in the court having jurisdiction over the
principal immovable property; and (3) if there is no matrimonial
domicile and immovable property in the state, then in the court
having jurisdiction over the principal movable effects.51 Author-
ity is granted to the court having jurisdiction to transfer the
whole or any part of the proceeding to a forum "where it would
be more to the advantage or manifest convenience of the parties
to have such suits or actions heard or tried."52 The court which
rendered the judgment of divorce or separation retains jurisdic-
tion to render "orders and decrees protecting and preserving the
rights of the parties to said property, prior to such partition or
liquidation." 53
Third-Party Practice
Prior to 1954, the Louisiana counterpart to the modern third-
party practice of Anglo-American jurisdictions has been the call
in warranty. This procedural device was borrowed from French
law54 and, since it was intended to implement both the personal
and the real warranty, was much broader than the parent of
modern American third-party impleader - the common law
49. La. Acts 1954, No. 448, incorporated as LA. R.S. 13:4991 (Supp. 1954).
50. 218 La. 603, 50 So.2d 208 (1950).
51. La. Acts 1954, No. 448 § 1, incorporated as LA. R.S. 13:4991(A) (Supp.
1954).
52. Id. § 2, LA. R.S. 13:4991(B) (Supp. 1954).
53. Id. § 3, LA. R.S. 13:4991(C) (Supp. 1954).
54. The notes of the redactors of the Louisiana Code of Practice of 1825
cite "Pothier, civil procedure, chap. 2, art. 2, § 1" as the source of the call
in warranty. Projet of the Code of Practice of 1825, 2 LA. LEOAL ARCHIVES
65 (1937).
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voucher to warranty in real actions.55 The call in warranty has
worked very effectively with respect to the real warranty; but
it has had a most hectic experience in Louisiana in performing
its role of implementing personal warranties. For years, our
Supreme Court restricted its use to the instances - entirely
theoretical-where there was privity between the original plain-
tiff and the defendant in warranty.5 6 In 1905, this utterly un-
workable rule was repudiated in Muntz v. Algiers & G. Ry.,5'7
and the way should have been opened for the effective use of
this procedural device. Unfortunately, in the Muntz case, the
court gratuitously threw in a dictum to the effect that "there
must be a contract of warranty between such defendant and the
person so called in."58 This was soon expanded into the direct
holding that the call in warranty cannot be employed in cases
involving personal warranty unless based upon a contract of
warranty or upon a statutory provision expressly permitting the
defendant in warranty to be called in.59 The result has been an
inability to use the device for the purpose of obtaining a judg-
ment over, in the numerous cases where the third party is in-
debted to the defendant for all or a part of the obligation sued
upon by plaintiff, but the liability of the third person arises ex
lege rather than from an express contract of warranty.
For these reasons, in the projet of the proposed new Code of
Practice, the Louisiana State Law Institute recommended that
the call in warranty be discarded, and that there be substituted
the "third-party action,"6 0 based substantially upon federal third-
party practice.6 1 These two devices are not identical, as there are
at least three differences between them.6 2 Under the Law In-
55. For a discussion of the role played by the common law voucher to
warranty in the development of modern third-party impleader practices,
see MILLAR, CIVIL PROCEDURE OF THE TRIAL COURT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 159
(1952).
56. See the list of cases overruled in Muntz v. Algiers & G. Ry., 114 La.
437, 38 So. 410 (1905).
57. 114 La. 437, 38 So. 410 (1905).
58. Id. at 447, 38 So. at 414.
59. Bank of Baton Rouge v. lendrix, 194 La. 478, 193 So. 713 (1940);
Girouard v. Agate, 44 So.2d 388 (La. App. 1950). See also H. W. Bond &
Bro. v. New Orleans, 186 La. 60, 171 So. 572 (1936).
60. Arts. 43-51, 62-67, Book II, Rules of Pleading and Practice in Ordi-
nary Process, Title I, Pleading, ExPos2 DES MOTIFS No. 7, pp. 59-68, 79-85
(Louisiana State Law Institute, April 23, 1953), as amended by the Committee
of Semantics, Style and Publications on August 1-2, 1953, and by the Coun-
cil of the Institute on December 11-12, 1953.
61. FED. R. Civ. P. 14, as amended on December 27, 1946.
62. First, under federal practice, the ihird-party defendant must be "a
person not a party to the action." FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a). The proposed Lou-
isiana article is broader: the third-party defendant may be "any person,
1954]
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stitute's recommended third-party action the defendant may
bring in by his petition any person, including a co-defendant,
"who is his warrantor, or who is or may be liable to him for all
or part of the principal demand."' 3 The defendant in recon-
vention likewise is permitted to call in a third party under the
same circumstances; 6 4 and any third-party defendant in turn
may call in another under the same circumstances.6 5 The third-
party defendant may assert against the plaintiff in the principal
action any defenses which the third-party plaintiff has against
the principal demand. 6 The third-party petition may be filed
without leave of court at any time up to and including the
time the answer to the principal demand is filed; thereafter, it
may be filed only with leave of court, if it will not retard the
progress of the principal action."' A third-party defendant may
file the same exceptions and motions as a defendant in the prin-
cipal action, except that, if the latter is filed in the proper venue,
no objection of improper venue can be urged against the third-
party action. 5 The answer to the third-party action must be
filed within the delay allowed the defendant in a principal action,
"or at any time prior to a judgment by default" against the
third-party defendant.6 9
Including a co-defendant." See Art. 62, Pleading, op. cit. supra note 60.
The purpose of this difference was to eliminate the necessity for any coun-
terpart of the federal cross-claim. Cf. FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g).
Second, under federal practice the defendant must move for leave to
bring in the third-party defendant, and the matter addresses itself to thejudicial discretion of the trial judge. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a). The proposed
Louisiana article, like the present Art. 382, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1870, and
Rule 56 of the FEDERAL RULES OF ADMIRALTY, grants to the defendant initially
the right to bring in a third-party defendant.
Third, the only papers which must be served upon the third-party de-
fendant In federal practice are the summons and a copy of the third-party
complaint. FED. R. Civ. P. 14(a). This is in accord with our present rule
of requiring the service of only the citation and the answer embodying the
call in warranty upon the warrantor. Art. 383, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1870.
The Law Institute thought it advisable to require the service of citation
and a certified copy of all of the basic pleadings upon the third-party de-
fendant. See Art. 65, Pleading, op. cit. supra note 60.
63. See Art. 62, Pleading, op. cit. supra note 60.
64. Id. Art. 63.
65. Id. Art. 67.
66. Id. Art. 66.
67. Id. Art. 45.
68. Id. Art. 46.
69. Id. Art. 47. The "judgment by default" mentioned in this proposed
article is the "preliminary default" of the professional vernacular, and not
the "confirmation of default." This rule was adopted to prevent the third-
party defendant from waiting until the commencement of trial to file his
answer. Otherwise, the third-party plaintiff would either have to introduce
all of his evidence prior to trial, on the confirmation of a default against
the third-party defendant, or run the risk of being surprised by an answer
filed by the third-party defendant immediately before the commencement
of the trial.
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The statute adopting third-party practice,70 based upon the
third-party action proposed by the Louisiana State Law Institute,
was the most important procedural enactment of the last ses-
sion. It should constitute a material improvement over the
Louisiana call in warranty. But the piecemeal adoption of the
Law Institute's recommendations will result in a few minor diffi-
culties. The articles on the third-party action proposed by the
Law Institute were not complete in themselves, but were sup-
plemented by other articles relating generally to all of the
proposed incidental actions: reconvention, intervention, and the
third-party action."' The 1954 act adopted only the proposed
articles on the third-party action. The result is that hiatuses
exist on the questions of when the third-party petition may be
filed; whether it may be filed with or without leave of court;
whether a third-party defendant may file exceptions; and as
to the remedy of the third-party plaintiff if the third-party
defendant does not file his answer timely.7
2
Appellate Procedure
Originally, under Article 911 of the Codes of Practice of
1825 and 1870, judgments of the Supreme Court became final
after three judicial days of rendition. The unsuccessful party
had to file an application for rehearing before the judgment
became final.73 In 1879, this delay was enlarged somewhat by
an amendment of Article 911, so that judgments rendered by the
Supreme Court at New Orleans became final after six judicial
days of rendition, while those rendered at other places continued
70. La. Acts 1954, No. 433, authored by the I-Ion. Albert B. Koorie, Rep-
resentative from Orleans Parish, incorporated as LA. R.S. 13:3381-3386 (Supp.
1954).
71. Arts. 43-51, Pleading, op. cit. supra note 60.
72. No particular difficulties should be experienced because of the first
two hiatuses. The incorporation of the third-party petition in the answer,
and filing it with leave of court, should effectively sidestep all technical
objections attributable to the lack of any express provision regarding the
time and manner of filing the third-party petition. The courts should ex-
perience no difficulty in holding the articles of the Code of Practice on the
exceptions applicable to the third-party petition.
The third hiatus, however, may cause difficulties. See note 69 supra,
There are no express provisions in the statute as to the delay for filing
an answer to the third-party petition. Assuming that the courts will bridge
this gap by holding the delays for filing an answer to the principal demand
applicable, the third-party plaintiff will be impaled upon the horns of a
dilemma. In cases where the third-party defendant fails to answer timely,
the third-party plaintiff must either take and confirm a default against
him prior to trial, or run the risk of being surprised by his answer filed
at, or shortly prior to, the commencement of the trial.
73. Art. 912, LA. CODES OF PRACTICE of 1825 and 1870.
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to become final after three judicial days of rendition.m7 4 In 1908,
an act was adopted providing that judgments of the Supreme
Court became final and executory on the fifteenth calendar day
after rendition, within or without term time, and that applica-
tions for rehearing must be filed before the judgment became
executory.7 5 While this statute contained no repealing clause,
it impliedly repealed Article 911. Even though the 1908 act
did not refer to the article, the majority of the authors on Lou-
isiana practice works indicated that Article 911 had been re-
enacted thereby.76
In the revision of the general statutes of the state, through
inadvertence, and under the impression that the delays for
applying for rehearing in the Supreme Court were provided by
Article 911, the Louisiana State Law Institute recommended the
repeal of the 1908 statute, and this recommendation was adopted
by the legislature.7 7 When the resulting hiatus was called to
the attention of the Supreme Court, the latter immediately
amended its rules so as to provide the delay for applying for
rehearings. 5 The Supreme Court, however, requested the Law
Institute to prepare the necessary bill to bridge this gap legis-
latively. At the 1954 session, this bill was adopted, and the
statute governing the delays for applying for rehearings in the
intermediate appellate courts was expanded so as to include
therein provision for a delay of fourteen calendar days for
applying for rehearings in the Supreme Court. 9
Under Louisiana practice, a number of different rules exist
as to who has the duty of lodging the transcript of appeals in
the appellate court. In appeals from justices of the peace,8 0 and
74. La. Acts 1879, No. 18, p. 33, amending and re-enacting Art. 911, LA.
CODE OF PRACTICE of 1870.
75. La. Acts 1908, No. 223, p. 341.
76. CODE OF PRACTICE OF THE STATE OF LOUISIANA 503 (Dart ed. 1932); id. at
1021 (1942); 1 MCMAHoN, LOUISIANA PRACTICE 1040 (1939). An older annotated
edition of the Code of Practice, however, did show Article 911 as being re-
placed by La. Acts 1908, No. 223, p. 341. CODE OF PRACTICE OF LOUISIANA 644
(Marr ed. 1927).
77. By La. Acts 1950(E.S.), No. 2, § 2, p. 4.
78. On January 15, 1954, the Supreme Court amended Rule XII, § 1,
of its Revised Rules, so as to make the first sentence thereof read as fol-
lows: "Petitions for rehearings must be filed on or before the fourteenth
calendar day after the rendition of judgment, and no extension of the time
therefor will be granted."
79. La. Acts 1954, No. 51, amending LA. R.S. 13:4446 (1950). This amend-
ment makes no change whatsoever in the delays for applying for rehearing
in any of the appellate courts.
80. Art. 1135, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1870, as last amended by La. Acts
1908, No. 226, p. 343.
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in cases involving one hundred dollars or less appealed from
the city courts of New Orleans to the Court of Appeal for the
Parish of Orleans,"' it is the duty of the justice of the peace or
city court judge to lodge the transcript. In cases appealed from
district courts to the Courts of Appeal, First and Second Cir-
cuits, it is the duty of the clerk of court.8 2 In cases appealed to
the Supreme Court,83 those appealed from district courts to the
Court of Appeal for the Parish of Orleans, 4 and cases involving
more than one hundred dollars appealed from city courts of
New Orleans to the Court of Appeal for the Parish of Orleans8 5
it is the duty of the appellant to lodge the transcript in the
appellate court. The ruJe that the appellant has this duty is
fraught with danger, sir:.e, if he fails to lodge the transcript
before or within three days of the original return day, or to
obtain an extension thereof, the appeal will be dismissed.8 6
Even greater danger exists when the return day has been ex-
tended, for the three days of grace are not available for an
extended return date. 7
One of the acts adopted in the last legislative session will
operate to ameliorate the rigors of this rule somewhat. It pro-
vides that, in cases appealed to the Court of Appeal for the
Parish of Orleans, whenever an extension of the return day has
been obtained because of the clerk's noncompletion of the tran-
script, all delays thereafter are imputable to the clerk, and this
delay shall effect an automatic extension of the return day until
the transcript is actually lodged.88 The statute is an excellent
one, but it does not go far enough. The solution of the problem
recommended by the Louisiana State Law Institute is simpler,
broader, and more effective.89
81. LA. R.S. 13:1951 (1950); Art. 1135, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1870, as
last amended by La. Acts 1908, No. 226, p. 343; Manfre v. Corbello, 215 La.
81, 39 So.2d 830 (1949).
82. LA. R.S. 13:4445 (1950); Woodward v. Blair, 197 So. 920 (La. App.
1940), 15 TULANE L. REV. 304 (1941).
83. Art. 587, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1870.
84. Art. 587, LA. CODE OF PRACTICE of 1870; Lewis v. Burglass, 186 La. 36,
171 So. 564 (1936). See also Note, 15 TULANE L. REv. 304 (1941).
85. LA. R.S. 13:1971 (1950); Lewis v. Burglass, 186 La. 36, 171 So. 564
(1936). See also Note, 15 TULANE L. REV. 304 (1941).
86. Lewis v. Burglass, 186 La. 36, 171 So. 564 (1936); State ex rel. Marcade
v. New Orleans, 216 La. 587, 44 So.2d 305 (1949); and cases cited in Note,
15 TULANE L. REv. 304 (1941).
87. New Iberia Nat. Bank v. Lyons, 164 La. 1017, 115 So. 130 (1927) and
cases cited; State ex rel. Marcade v. New Orleans, 216 La. 587, 44 So.2d 305
(1949).
88. La. Acts 1954, No. 636, incorporated as LA. R.S. 13:4437.1 (Supp. 1954).
89. In all cases, the clerk of the trial court must cause the record on
appeal "to be lodged with the appellate court on or before the return day
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Miscellaneous
Ten different 1954 acts, applicable to cases where process
may be served upon the Secretary of State, permit this service
upon a person in his office designated by the Secretary of State,
during the latter's absence. 0
One of the 1954 procedural statutes regulates the effect of
the redemption of immovable property previously sold under
execution, which had been sold for taxes prior to the judicial
sale.91 Under this statute, the redemption vests "in the pur-
chaser at such sale under execution a title as valid as if such
redemption had been effected prior to the sale under execution."
The act also prohibits any action by any debtor, his heirs, suc-
cessors, or assigns to claim any property sold under execution
under these circumstances, unless brought within six months
of the effective date of the statute. Apparently, this 1954 act was
adopted to overrule the decision in Guidry v. Sigler.9 2 This case
appears flagrantly unsound; 93 because of its unfortunate effect
or any extension thereof, upon the payment to him by the appellant of
all fees due in connection with the appeal, including the filing fee required
by the appellate court to lodge the appeal. Failure of the clerk to prepare
and lodge the record on appeal either timely or correctly shall not prejudice
the appeal." Art. 12, Book III, Proceedings in Appellate Courts, Title I,
Appellate Procedure, ExPosA DES MOTIFS NO. 14, pp. 34-35 (Louisiana State
Law Institute, May 3, 1954), as amended by the Committee on Semantics,
Style and Publications of the Institute on June 5-6, 1954). This solution was
suggested by the provisions of LA. R.S. 13:4445 (1950) applicable now only
to the Courts of Appeal, First and Second Circuits, which has worked most
satisfactorily.
90. These acts amended the following statutory provisions, governing
service of process in suits against the defendants indicated below: La. Acts
1954, No. 133, amending LA. R.S. 22:558 (1950) (fraternal benefit societies);
La. Acts 1954, No. 134, amending LA. R.S. 22:1268 (1950) (surplus line in-
surers); La. Acts 1954, No. 135, amending LA. R.S. 22:437 (1950) (reciprocal In-
surers); La. Acts 1954, No. 136, amending LA. R.S. 13:3474 (1950) (nonresi-
dent operators of motor vehicles causing injury or damage on Louisiana
highways); La. Acts 1954, No. 137, amending LA. R.S. 13:3479 (1950) (non-
resident operators of watercraft causing injury or damage on waters of
state); La. Acts 1954, No. 138, amending LA. R.S. 12:37(C) (1950) (business
corporations); La. Acts 1954, No. 139, amending LA. R.S. 12:123(C) (1950)
(non-profit corporations); La. Acts 1954, No. 140, amending LA. R.S. 37:1440
(1950) (nonresident real estate brokers); La. Acts 1954, No. 141, amending
LA. R.S. 9:5164 (1950) (agency or instrumentality of United States); La.
Acts 1954, No. 142, amending LA. R.S. 13:3471(5c, d) (23) (1950) (foreign
corporations).
91. La. Acts 1954, No. 539, incorporated as LA. R.S. 13:4289 (Supp. 1954).
92. 21 So.2d 232, 233 (La. App. 1945), holding that "an attempted sale
of property under execution where the property has been adjudicated to
the state for the nonpayment of taxes and after the time for redemption
has expired can confer no right or title in the purchaser at such sale." See
also Guidry v. Sigler, 20 So.2d 631 (La. App. 1945).
93. The opinion is pitched upon the settled rule that, after the three-year
period for redeeming property adjudicated to the state has expired, the
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upon the title to immovables sold under execution, it had to be
overruled legislatively.
Two identical acts adopted at the last legislative session
amended the pertinent Code article9 4 and the appropriate statu-
tory provision,95 respectively, prohibiting suspensive appeals in
expropriation suits, and providing for the translation of owner-
ship in the property sought to be expropriated upon the deposit
by the plaintiff of the amount awarded to the defendant. The
first statute merely chaiged the depositary from the sheriff to
the registry of the court; the second made only editorial changes
in the language of the statutory provision amended.
Prior to 1952, the city courts of New Orleans had jurisdic-
tion over money demands not in excess of three hundred dol-
lars;96 and a statute provided that the manner and form w. pro-
ceedings "where said courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the
district courts of all suits for moneyed demands above one hun-
dred dollars and not exceeding three hundred dollars, shall be
governed by the general rules regulating proceedings before the
district courts," with certain exceptions not pertinent here.
(Italics supplied.) 7 In 1952, the jurisdiction of these city courts
was increased to permit them to adjudicate money demands not
in excess of one thousand dollars.98 This left a hiatus with respect
to the applicable procedure in suits for money demands above
three hundred dollars, and not in excess of one thousand dollars.
This gap was filled by a 1954 act deleting from the statute the
words italicized above.99
The dilatoriness of judges in rendering decisions in matters
state becomes the absolute owner of the property, and can dispose of it as
it sees fit.
What the court overlooked was that "as long as the title thereto is in
the state or in any of its political subdivisions" there was an absolute right
to redeem the property; and that all certificates of redemption "shall be in
the name of the original owner, to enure, however, to the benefit of any
and all persons holding rights under such owner." L.A. R.S. 47:2224 (1950).
The adjudicatee at the sale under execution not only had the right to redeem
the property himself, but if it was redeemed by the judgment debtor, it
enured to the benefit of the adjudicatee. The judicial sale, therefore, was
not a nullity, but transferred the right to acquire a valid title through re-
demption from the state, as long as title remained in the state or one of
its political subdivisions. Gamet's Estate v. Lindner, 159 La. 658, 106 So. 22
(1925); Lomel Realty Corp. v. Chopin, 177 La. 474, 148 So. 683 (1933). Cf.
Hayes v. Fridge, 156 La. 932, 101 So. 270 (1924).
94. La. Acts 1954, No. 705, amending Art. 2634, LA. CIVIL CODE of 1870.
95. La. Acts 1954, No. 706, amending LA. R.S. 19:13 (1950).
96. LA. CONST. Art. VII, § 91, as amended, November 3, 1936.
97. LA. R.S. 13:1971 (1950).
98. LA. CONST. Art. VII, § 91, as amended, November 4, 1952.
99. La. Acts 1954, No. 599, amending LA. R.S. 13:1971 (1950).
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submitted to them, and taken under advisement, has been the
subject of legislation in Louisiana since 1884. In that year, an
act was adopted requiring district and city court judges to
render decisions in all cases submitted to them within thirty
days, and to pass upon applications for new trial within seven
days.100 The penalty for each violation of these provisions was
the loss of three months of salary by the offending judge.1 1
Until this year, these provisions had no application to any of
the courts in the Parish of Orleans. 0 2 At the last session, how-
ever, the legislature removed this limitation, and made the
statutory provisions applicable to the courts of all parishes, spe-
cifically including Orleans. 0 3 Apparently, some of the judicial
brethren in New Orleans have shown greater celerity in cashing
their salary warrants than in deciding matters which they take
under advisement.
The objectives of this type of statute are commendable;
the approach to their attainment completely wrong. No real
improvement in the administration of justice can be effected
through threats and reprisals. A much more encouraging action
of the last legislature was the appropriation of twenty-five thou-
sand dollars to the Supreme Court to defray the expenses of the
Judicial Council. Plans for the future work of this most impor-
tant body include the periodical gathering of judicial statistics,
which will point up both congestions of the docket and judicial
lethargy. Within a period of three or four years, these statistics
will produce results which no punitive measures could ever ac-
complish.
100. La. Acts 1884, No. 72, § 1, p. 94, subsequently amended by La. Acts
1898, No. 94, § 1, p. 117, LA. R.S. 13:4207 (1950).
101. La. Acts 1884, No. 72, § 4, p. 94, as amended, La. Acts 1898, No. 94,
§ 4, p. 117, LA. R.S. 13:4210 (1950).
102. La. Acts 1884, No. 72, § 8, p. 94, as amended, La. Acts 1898, No. 94,
§ 8, p. 117, LA. R.S. 13:4211 (1950).
103. La. Acts 1954, No. 286, amending LA. R.S. 13:4211 (1950).
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